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Abstract. This paper investigates the application of CARMA, a recently devel-
oped quantitative process-algebra-based modelling language, to the stochastic
modelling of software defined networking (SDN). In SDN, a single controller
(or hierarchy of controllers) determines the behaviour of the switches that for-
ward traffic through the network, and it is used in a variety of settings including
cloud and data centres. This research is the initial phase of developing a method-
ology for agile formal modelling of performance and security aspects of SDN,
and focusses on the fat-tree network topology. The results demonstrate that the
CARMA language and its software tools which include the MultiVeStA statistical
model checker provide a good basis for modelling SDN.
1 Introduction
Traditionally, network modelling has been done by emulation on virtual machines using
a tool called mininet [29] or simulation using a tool such as ns-3 [9, 26]. Both of these
approaches consider the full network stack, which can be very expensive in terms of ini-
tial setup, as well as computational resources to execute. Other simulation approaches
allow for some abstraction [6, 8, 30] from these details, in order to reduce these over-
heads and various formal approaches have also been suggested [3, 4, 7, 27, 33–36, 40,
42], most of which have no quantitative features.
Our goal is to provide a novel approach to modelling the behaviour of networks
at a moderately high level of abstraction but with the ability to measure performance,
something that is missing from most formal approaches for networks. This will still
allow for a quantitative assessment of network behaviour which is crucial to evaluate
different configurations but provide a lighter-weight approach that the full-stack em-
ulation and simulation methods. Our approach models individual packets traversing a
network but abstracts from lower level concerns of the network stack. This may reduce
what questions can be answered by the model; however, it will still allow many ques-
tions of interest such as packet latency, to be answered much more quickly than the
traditional full stack emulation and simulation approaches, and hence provides an alter-
native approach. As is well known, formal modelling of computer systems has multiple
benefits including the ability to reason about a system before it is built, and to conduct
experiments using a model of an existing system without disrupting the system itself.
This paper considers how an existing probabilistic modelling language can be used
to simulate the behaviour of software defined networking (SDN) [15] at the packet
level, allowing for the investigation of performance and security properties, as well as
trade-offs between these properties. Specifically, we work with the quantitative formal
modelling language CARMA and examine how CARMA and CaSL, the textual language
of the CARMA Eclipse Plug-in tool [25, 32] support this type of modelling. MultiVeStA
[38] is integrated into a command-line version of the tool, allowing statistical model
checking of CARMA models on top of simulation.
The textual language of the CARMA tool provides an explicit syntax and a location
type for expressing location with respect to a structure that describes discrete space.
This motivated the choice of CARMA to model physical network topology and allows
for a parametric approach to network topology description. Also importantly for prac-
tical application of CARMA, the tool also provides a rich choice of attribute types, in-
cluding integer, real, enumerated types, Boolean, and finite lists and sets of these types.
Functions can be defined over all data types, to support programmatic aspects of mod-
els, and goes beyond process-algebra-style behaviour and interaction.
Our experiments show that there is a good match between the discrete space syn-
tax provided by CARMA and modelling network topology. This makes it possible to
separate network topology (and traffic) from the definition of generic network elements
such as hosts, switches and controllers. This has advantages in terms of speed of model
construction as well as ease of debugging models. The three major contributions of
this research are as follows. First, it provides an assessment of CARMA for modelling
network performance and security in SDN through the development of a model that
permits packet-level modelling. The model contains generic controller, switch and host
components that allow for the controller to send flow table rules to switches which are
then able to direct packets from one host to another through the network. Packets are
modelled explicitly and their header content is used by switches to determine how they
should be handled depending on the flow rule that applies. Furthermore, the model is
parametric with respect to the network description, allowing fast development of mod-
els with different topologies.
Second, it allows for experimentation with the fat-tree topology in a SDN setting
that considers the scalability of the topology with respect to packet latency which is a
standard measure of network performance, considering both uniform and MapReduce
traffic; with the goal of determining the packet rates at which the network become con-
gested and can no longer operate at line speed (the speed of the underlying network
connections) because of queues at switches. The performance cost of mitigation of at-
tacks is also considered. Finally, it explores the use of MultiVeStA for statistical model
checking of switch queue sizes, allowing for the exploration of the parameter space
of MapReduce traffic patterns, thereby integrating the use of different formal methods
approaches.
2 Background
This research contributes the first phase of the development of a general methodology
for modelling of networks and network security, and it is necessary to select a particular
case study for exploration of the potential of the approach. We have chosen to consider
the use of software defined networking (SDN) in data centres. This specifies the focus
and helps identify suitable examples with which to work. SDN is an ideal setting since it
is an industry standard whose deployment is wide-spread and increasing. As networking
requirements become more complex in cloud and data centre scenarios, SDN provides a
different approach based on a full network overview compared to other approaches. One
of the complexities that must be addressed is security and SDN offers opportunities and
challenges in this domain [12]. Furthermore, there is an ongoing need for assessment
of SDN performance due to the range of implementations and switch types [17].
The distinct roles of network elements in SDN maps well to CARMA components
which describe behaviour with the addition of store, allowing for internal state, which
is not often a feature of process algebras. Focussing on data centres allows the con-
sideration of regular topologies which is a good starting point for modelling. Regular
topologies also make large networking scenarios possible programmatically and we will
show later in the paper how CARMA supports this.
2.1 Software defined networking
In traditional networking, routers direct packets and have enough knowledge about the
state of the network to make forwarding decisions. Software defined networking [15]
takes a very different approach whereby the network switches are provided with flow
rules (by the controller which has an overview of all network behaviour) that specify
how packets should be directed. Each switch has a flow table that is stored in fast (but
expensive) ternary content-addressable memory (TCAM) which allows for fast look-up.
When a packet arrives at a switch, its header is compared with the flow table entries.
These entries may contain wildcards, and different packet headers may match a single
flow rule. If a match is found, the action specified by the rule is followed and counters
for the rule are updated, and if not the packet header is sent to the controller (which may
add a new rule to the switch for that packet header). The two most common actions for
a rule are forward on a port number, or drop where the packet is not forwarded.
Rules in the flow table can be divided into proactive and reactive. Reactive rules
are those that are installed when the controller must decide what to do with a packet
that does not match the rules at a switch. By contrast, proactive rules are those that
are installed by the controller as a switch becomes active, based on an overview of the
network topology and specific choice of a single route between each pair of hosts. We
focus on proactive rules and the performance of a balanced routing over a network. This
is not a limitation of the modelling as a variant of this model has been used to consider
reactive rules in the evaluation of an attack mitigation [10].
The controller makes decisions programmatically about the flows through the net-
work, determined routes from information about network topology, existing traffic and
updating routes when necessary. This route choice can have different aims such as per-
formance (efficient use of network bandwidth) or security (for example, mitigation for
covert channel attacks [41]).
2.2 Fat-tree topology
Our focus is on the fat-tree topology [2] that is used in data centres and is suitable
for use with SDN. In a standard tree topology, there may be a single switch at the top
level of the tree (the core) and this is a bottleneck. By contrast, the fat-tree topology is
Fig. 1. Fat tree with 6-port switches
based on k-port switches and provides more than one core switch. Figure 1 illustrates
the fat-tree topology obtained using 6-port switches The top block of nine switches
are the core. There are then k pods, each containing k switches. The layer of switches
immediately under the core is referred to as the aggregate and the layer before the hosts,
the edge. The 6-port topology supports 54 hosts and there are 9 routes between each pair
of hosts that are in different pods, as can be seen from the figure by considering the first
host of the first pod and the first host of the last pod. The controller is not included
in this diagram and there is research into where controllers should be placed for best
performance [22]. In this research, we abstract from these details, as discussed later.
More generally, a 3-level fat tree based on commodity switches with k ports has a
core of k2/4 switches and k2 switches at the aggregate and edge level. This allows for
the support of k3/4 hosts. Between each pair of hosts, there are k2/4 routes, one through
each switch of the core. The use of commodity switches allows for a cheap but efficient
topology, and it is well suited for SDN because of multiple routes.
Over and above modelling topologies, we need to model traffic patterns as well. In
the experiments, we will consider two traffic patterns: one where there is traffic between
all hosts where we consider at what traffic levels, the packet latency becomes too high.
The second considers the MapReduce pattern where many hosts communicate with a
single host to convey the results of calculations done in parallel.
3 Related work
In the case of SDN, mininet [29] allows for emulation by modelling actual network
behaviour on multiple virtual machines. A limitation of mininet is that it runs in real-
time as an emulator and hence does not scale to large systems. Network simulators
such as ns-3 [9, 26] simulate the full network stack behaviour. Both of these approaches
are costly in terms of initial set-up and have steep learning curves. An alternative is
a much more abstract approach such as CloudSim which is used to model large SDN
data centres [6] but this is an understanding of network performance before building
the model, and hence is not suitable for the type of network performance and security
modelling proposed here. A different approach is taken using TopoGen in modelling
of SDN topologies [30] where the focus of the tool is in supporting large topologies
and then using hybrid modeling, simulation and control of data networks based on a
hybrid DEVS (Discrete Event System Specification) formalism where some packets
are modelled explicitly and some as flows [8].
Various formal approaches have been suggested such as NetKat [4], Veriflow [27]
and others [3, 7, 33–36, 40, 42]. Probabilistic NetKat [39] is the closest to our approach
but is limited to a time-homogeneous approach. Using CARMA, it is possible to con-
sider behaviour over time as parameters vary, allowing for the dynamic modelling of
the effects together with mitigation of attacks, as illustrated later. Some process alge-
bras have also been proposed for network modelling such as [28] but most focus on
wireless or ad hoc networks and are not quantitative such as [16]. In the case of the
spatial extension of PEPA (which is a stochastic process algebra that influenced the
development of CARMA) [18], CARMA offers a much richer way to specify behaviour.
4 Overview of CARMA
CARMA (Collective Adaptive Resource-sharing Markovian Agents) is a process-algebra-
based quantitative modelling language developed for the modelling of collective adap-
tive systems with explicit support for the modelling of discrete space, as well as separate
specification of an environment. [25, 32]. It has roots in process algebras developed for
performance evaluation such as PEPA [23] and biological modeling such as Bio-PEPA
[11], and has (time-inhomogeneous) continuous-time Markov chain semantics. It has
richer interaction than PEPA or Bio-PEPA, and uses attribute-based communication
similar to that of SCEL [14] and AbC [1]. It has been used to model taxi movement
[24], carpooling [43], ambulance deployment [19] and pedestrian mobility [21].
The language has two forms: the mathematical definition of CARMA [25] and the
languageCaSL [20] of the CARMA Eclipse Plug-in (available at quanticol.sourceforge.net).
Both will be used in this paper. The former will be used to provide abstract presenta-
tions of the models, and the latter to describe how measures and spatial concepts are
defined with the software tools, and thereby illustrate the power of the implementation
with respect to network topology modelling.
The basic behavioural unit of a CARMA model is a component which consists of
communicating behaviour specified using process-algebra-style prefixes (actions), an
initial behaviour and a store of attributes that characterise the component. Interaction
between components can be unicast or broadcast. The components of a model form
a collective which then operates within an environment. The environment includes a
global store, and updates to elements in the store are triggered by actions performed by
components. It also specifies the rates and probabilities at which actions are performed,
and allows for new components to be added to the collective when given actions are
performed by components. In the context of the SDN model, packet rates will appear in
the environment as will global attributes to calculate packet latency.
To understand the basic behaviour of component, consider a component that has
three attributes v, x and y in its store. Behaviour in this component can be specified in
the following form. Here > indicates true and ⊥ false.
A def= signal[>]〈v〉{a← a−1}.A+
new signal count?[my.b < b](new a){a← new a}.A+
[a = 0]finished?[⊥]〈〉.nil
Process A can repeatedly send out a signal of v to one other component (and wait until
it is received) at which point the value of a is decreased by one. It can also receive a
broadcast communication (indicated by the asterisk) from any other component which
has a larger b value than it, which communicates a value that is then stored as a. This
is attribute-based communication: A can only “hear” from components with a larger b
value. However, if a becomes 0, then the process can perform an internal action and
become the process with no behaviour. The use of a broadcast action with a false pred-
icate leads to an internal action since no other component can satisfy the predicate,
and broadcast is not blocking. Thus the action happens without interaction. As will be
seen in the SDN model, sometimes an attribute is updated by calling a function, and no
interaction with other components is necessary, and hence we use this form of action.
The component containing behaviour A, say CompA, can be described as a compo-
nent that attempts to communicate (by unicast) the value v a certain number of times
after which it ceases communication. However, imagine that there are other components
(not specified here) which are allowed to communicate a new value of a to CompA. This
can either reduce or increase how many more times the value v is sent by CompA. The
other components which can communicate new values must have larger b values (which
could be a priority) than CompA to successfully change a.
Formally, components have the syntax C ::= 0 | (P,γ)where 0 is the null component,
P is a process that describes behaviour and γ is the store. Stores map from attribute
names to basic values. The syntax of processes that define the behaviour of components
are specified by the following
P,Q ::= nil | kill
| act.P | P+Q
| P | Q | [pi]P
| A (A def= P)
act ::= α?[pi]〈−→e 〉σ | α [pi]〈−→e 〉σ
| α?[pi](−→x )σ | α [pi](−→x )σ
e ::= a | my.a | x | v | now | · · ·
pi ::= > | ⊥ | e1 ./ e2 | ¬pi | pi ∧pi | · · ·
where
– α is an action type; pi is a predicate;
– e is an expression; x is a variable; −→· indicates a sequence of elements;
– a is an attribute name; v is a basic value;
– σ is an update defined by a function from Γ to Dist(Γ ) where Dist(Γ ) is the set of
probability distributions over Γ . This allows for stochastic updates.
The behaviour includes the absence of behaviour nil, the ability to remove a component
from the collective kill, action prefix act.P, choice P+Q, parallel composition P | Q,
predicate prefix [pi]P where the behaviour as P is only available if the guard pi defined
over the component’s attributes is true, and constant definition. Expressions include
now for the current simulation time and my.a which refers to the value of the attribute
a in the current component. When referring to an attribute shared by a two components,
my.a allows for distinction between the two in predicates that constrain interaction.
The different prefixes specify the type of interaction.
Broadcast output: α?[pi]〈−→e 〉σ
Broadcast input: α?[pi](−→x )σ
Unicast output: α [pi]〈−→e 〉σ
Unicast input: α [pi](−→x )σ
Here α is an action name, pi is a predicate over attributes of the sender and the receiver,
and σ specifies attribute updates. For output, −→e is a list of output expressions, and for
input, −→x is a list of variables, as is standard. Broadcast actions are indicated by the
presence of an asterisk. As mentioned above, an internal action has the form α?[⊥]〈〉σ .
The predicates after the action name in a prefix determine who takes part in the
communication. Rates, probabilities and weights associated with an action name are
recorded in the environment element of the model and may depend on attributes of the
sender (in the case of broadcast which is non-blocking) and on the sender and receiver
(in the case of unicast which is blocking). We use predicates in the SDN model to ensure
unicast communication only occurs between components that are directly connected in
the network and this is specified by the space description.
A collective N consist of either a component C or the parallel composition of two
collectives, N ::=C | N ‖ N, and a CARMA model then consists of a collective together
with an environment S ::= N in E . The environment collects together all of the infor-
mation necessary for the collectives to operate including rules that regulate the system
such as rates of interaction and probabilities that interaction may occur, as well as global
information. The environment consists of two elements: a global store γg to record the
value of global attributes, and an evolution rule ρ . This is a function which, depending
on the current time (using now), the global store and the current state of the collec-
tive returns four functions defined on stores and action names. These are known as the
evaluation context.
Probabilities: µp(γs,γr,α) determines the probability that a component with store γr
can receive a message from a component with store γs when α is executed;
Weights: µw(γs,γr,α) determines the weight allocated to α executed by a component
with store γr receiving a message from a component with store γs. This weighting
determines the probabilities between different unicast actions.
Rates: µr(γ,α) provides the execution rate of action α executed at a component with
store γ;
Updates: µu(γ,α) determines the updates on the environment (global store and col-
lective) induced by the execution of action α at a component with store γ . The
execution of an action can modify the values of global variables and also add new
components to the collective.
Figure 6 provides an example of this evaluation context as used in the SDN model.
For the rates and updates, the function is expressed as a series of cases based on the
particular action involved. For the SDN model, there is little use of the component
stores in the definitions. The only explicit occurrence is in the update for for the action
log packet?, although there are more occurrences in the elided details of the rates for
packet generation and the traffic patterns which could be determined by the identity of
the source or destination of a packet.
The operational semantics of CARMA specifications are defined through transition
relations. The semantic rules can be found in [32]. These relations are defined in the
FUTS style [13] and are described using a triple (N, `,N ) where the first element is
a component, or a collective, or a system; the second element is a transition label; and
the third element is a function associating each component, collective, or system with
a non-negative number. If this value is positive, it represents the rate of the exponential
distribution characterising the time needed for the execution of the action represented
by `. A zero value is associated with unreachable terms. FUTS style semantics are
used because it makes explicit an underlying (time-inhomogeneous) Action Labelled
Markov Chain, which can be simulated with standard kinetic Monte Carlo algorithms.
Two further elements are important for modelling with CARMA. Measures define
the outputs of a CARMA model when it is simulated. A space description defines the
discrete space model over which a CARMA model will operate. It defines a weighted
graph structure, and each component can be located at a node in this graph. To aid
clarity of presentation, these two elements will be presented using CaSL, the textual
language of the software tools, in the next section where the model is introduced.
5 The SDN model
CARMA is a rich formalism developed for a specific purpose; however it is applicable
to a variety of systems. For SDN, an important goal of the model is to be parametric
with respect to the network specification. Therefore, generic components model various
aspects of the system and there is no specification of the network details outside of the
portion of the model that describes the network topology and traffic parameters. Thus
we need only define four generic components for our model: host, switch, controller
and timer. For some scenarios, deterministic time delays are required and the timer
component supports their modelling. In the model presented here, it determines when
data should be collected from the switches by the controller. Each switch has a unique
location and each host is located at a switch.
The interaction between the components is illustrated in Figure 2 where compo-
nents with a single border have a single occurrence, and with double borders, multiple
occurrences. The CARMA components for all four are given in Figures 3 and 4. The
notation xi refers to element i of array x, except in the case of action names, where
actioni refers to indexed action names. The model presented is an abstraction of the
CaSL model developed (for reasons of space) and some aspects are only mentioned in
passing. Furthermore, this model concentrates on proactive flow rules, and the proce-
dure for dealing with packets that do not match a rule are not described.
The controller and switch components call various functions to support their be-
haviour. Examples of controller functions are SelectRoutes which generates specific
routings from the network topology, CalcStats and CalcFlow which takes switch counter
information and calculates overall flows between hosts which can be then used by func-
tions to update the routing array. Additional functionality within the SDN paradigm can
be added by providing new functions rather than modifying the components, in most
cases. It is also possible to add novel behaviour that SDN does not currently support
such as probabilistic choice of rules to decide forwarding of packets in switches. With
Controller Switch Host
Timer
next collection
comm
comm
comm
get flow table get update
stats request
send stats
comm cont
Fig. 2. Interaction of generic components
just these four component types and a separate network description, it is possible to
create large network examples for analysis.
The host component (Figure 3) allows for different traffic patterns specified as sep-
arate parallel components. An example of this is MapReduce which will be used in
the experiments. Details of these have been elided for reasons of space. However, the
basic idea is that certain traffic patterns will either be switched on or off as indicated
by a Boolean attribute in the component. When a pattern is on, a packet corresponding
to that traffic pattern can be sent. The host component repeatedly generates and sends
packets, keeping count of the number. For measurement of packet latency, the time a
packet is sent is included in the packet itself, together with the source, destination and
protocol. In parallel, the host receives packets for which it is the destination and counts
them. Both of these are done using the comm action together which a predicate that
ensures that communication can only occur between connected network elements. This
is discussed further in Section 5.2 below.
The switch component (Figure 3) first receives its rule table from the controller and
then processes incoming packets that are put into a queue when they arrive. For each
packet, a matching rule is sought from the flow table where the flow table is an array
of rule records which include source host identifier, destination host identifier, proto-
col, action to be done and counter to record how many times the rule is used. The action
associated with the rule is applied: a packet can be dropped, sent to the controller, or for-
warded. Parallel components wait for communication from the controller for statistics
requests and rule updates, and set appropriate flags. Packet processing must be paused
to update rules or send the flow table to the controller whenever an update is available or
a request has been sent. Switch components use a single action comm to communicate
with each other and hosts, and the significance of this will be discussed in Section 5.2.
The controller component uses the function GenTop to generate all possible routes
between each pair of switches from the space description (see Section 5.1 for details
of this description). From this collection of routes, a routing array is obtained using
the function SelectRoutes to describe the route that a packet from one host to another
will take. In SDN, exactly one route is chosen for a flow of packets from one host to
another. In the model, the routes chosen can be balanced with respect to the number
of hosts, so flows are evenly spread across core switches. They can also be unbalanced
where a single core switch is used for all flows, or flows can be randomly assigned to
different routes. The function ConstructTables is used to construct the flow tables for
each switch which are then communicated to each switch, one by one. The controller
component then interacts with the timer component to wait until it is time for the next
Store of Host component:
host host identifier
loc location of switch that host is attached to
in number of packets input
out number of packets output
. . . traffic pattern information for each traffic type
Behaviour of Host component:
Output def= ∑i gen pkt type?i [⊥]〈〉{out pkt← GenPktTypei(host,now, . . .)}.Send
Send def= comm[ReceiverIsConn(my.loc, loc)]〈out pkt〉{out← out+1}.Output
Input def= comm[SenderIsConn(my.loc, loc)∧Dest(p) = host](p){in pkt← p}.Log
Log def= log packet?[⊥]〈〉{in← in+1}.Input
TPi
def
= traffic pattern behaviour for packet typei
Initial state of Host component: Output | Input | TP1 | . . . | TPn
Store of Switch component:
loc switch identifier
flow table table of flow rules
q queue of input packets
upd if true then rule updates are available for installation
stats if true then a stats request is pending
Behaviour of Switch component:
Start def= get flow table[SenderIsContr(loc)]〈t〉{flow table← t}.Process
Process def= [size(q)> 0]get head?[⊥]〈〉{pkt← head(q),q← tail(q)}.Match
Match def= find rule?[⊥]〈〉{rule← FindRule(flow table,pkt)}.Count
Count def= incr count?[⊥]〈〉{flow table← IncrCount(flow table,rule)}.Act
Act def= [Action(rule) = DROP]skip?[⊥]〈〉.Update+
[Action(rule) = CONT]comm cont[ReceiverIsContr(loc)]〈pkt〉.Update+
[Action(rule) = FORW]comm[ReceiverIsConn(my.loc, loc)]〈pkt〉.Update
Update def= [upd]rule update?[⊥]〈〉{flow table← RuleUpdate(rt,u),upd→⊥}.Stats+
[¬upd]skip?[⊥]〈〉.Stats
Stats def= [stats]send stats?[ReceiverIsContr(loc)]〈flow table〉{stats→⊥}.Process+
[¬stats]skip?[⊥]〈〉.Process
Listen def= comm[SenderIsConn(my.loc, loc)](p){q← Append(q, p)}.Listen
StatsReq def= stats request[SenderIsContr(loc)](){stats←>}.StatsReq
UpdRec def= get update[SenderIsContr(loc)](u){upd←>,flow table← u}.UpdRec
Initial state of Switch component: Start | Listen | StatsReq | UpdRec
Behaviour of Timer component:
NextCollect def= next collection[loc = [Con]]〈now〉.NextCollect
Initial state of Timer component: NextCollect
Fig. 3. Host, Switch and Timer components
Store of Controller component:
loc controller identifier, always Con
top topology, describes all routes between pairs of switches
routing routing array, describes a single route between any pair of hosts
tables array of flow tables, one entry for each switch
last t time of last statistics collection
sw data array of switch data, one entry for each switch
nwf flow total flow between each pair of hosts
sw upd array of switch updates, one for each switch
Behaviour of Controller component:
StartCon def= gen top?[⊥]〈〉{top← GenTop()}.Routing
Routing def= choose routes?[⊥]〈〉.{routing← SelectRoutes(>)}.SwInit
SwInit def= construct tables?[⊥]〈〉{tables← ConstructTables(routing), i← 0}.SwInst
SwInst def= [i < S]get flow table[loc = [i]]〈tablesi〉{i← i+1}.SwInst+
[i = S]skip?[⊥]〈{i← 0}〉.Wait
Wait def= next collection[t > last t+ collect interval](t){last t← t}.Request
Request def= [i < S]stats request[loc = [i]]〈〉.Collect+
[i = S]calc flow?[⊥]〈〉{nwf flow = CalcFlow(nwf flow,sw data), i← 0}.Analysis
Collect def= send stats?[loc = [i]](d)
{sw datai← CalcStats(d,now,sw datai), i← i+1}.Request
Analysis def= (. . . decisions about changes to routing array based on nwf flow resulting in
new rules for switches stored in sw upd. . . ).SwUpd
SwUpd def= [i < S]rule update[loc = [i]]〈sw updi〉.SwUpd+
[i = S]skip?[⊥]〈〉{i← 0}.Wait
Initial state of Controller component: StartUpCon
Fig. 4. Controller component
collection of statistics, which is also done one-by-one from each switch. The counts in
the flow tables of each switch are compared with the counts at the previous collection
and traffic flows between hosts are obtained which can then be used to determine switch
updates. As mentioned previously, this model considers proactive aspects of SDN rather
than reactive, and hence the details of switch updates have not been included.
5.1 Space syntax for network description
To specify a network description in a CARMA SDN model requires the expression of the
network topology in the space syntax which is independent of the generic components
defined above, as well as traffic information for the network which is captured in two
arrays for a specific traffic pattern. The first specifies the rate at which each host gen-
erates packets, and the second specifies the distribution of destinations for the packets,
allowing for stochastic behaviour to be defined.
There is also second level of parametericity in CARMA SDN modelling. The size
and shape of various topologies can be parametric and the space description can be de-
fined to take this into account. For example, in the fat-tree topology, the parameter that
const k = 6; // number of ports in each switch
space kPort_FatTree_Pod (){
universe <int x>
nodes { for i from 0 to k {[i];} }
connections { for i from k/2 to k {
for j from 0 to k/2 {
[i] -> [j] { port=j };
[j] -> [i] { port=i }; } } }
}
const Host_Switch = [: [3] ,[3] ,[3] ,[4] ,[4] ,[4] ,[5] ,[5] ,[5] :];
const Host_Port = [: 3,4,5,3,4,5,3,4,5 :];
Fig. 5. Space specification for one pod of Figure 1 (partially parameterised)
specifies the size of the network is the number of ports in the type of switch used. For
the experiments described later, the network topology description is parametric in this
number, and increasing the parameter, increases the size of the network without time-
consuming model updates as would be necessary with an emulator such as mininet.
The space syntax of CaSL, developed to model discrete space in collective adaptive
systems, provides a mechanism to describe a directed graph, and this separates the
network topology information from that of component behaviour. In the SDN model,
each switch is assigned a unique location and each host is assigned the location of the
switch to which it is attached (multi-homed hosts can not be modelled currently). Each
edge in the network graph is described by [a] -> [b] { port = p }. This specifies
that there is a network connection from switch a to switch b and it is accessed through
port p on switch a. Figure 5 illustrates how this language can be used to describe the
left-most pod of Figure 1 and the nine hosts it supports.
We number the six switches in the left-most pod with 0,...,6 from left to right and
top to bottom, and the six ports of a single switch are numbered in the same way. The
nine hosts are numbered from 0 to 8. The bottom right switch of the pod is switch 5,
with port 0 connected to switch 0, port 1 to switch 1 and port 2 to switch 2. Furthermore,
port 3 is connected to host 6, port 4 to host 7 and port 5 to host 8. The ports 0, 1 and
2 of switches 0, 1 and 2 are not connected since we are considering the pod on its own
for this example. Using this numbering of switches, ports and hosts, we can describe
the network topology using the space keyword. Six locations are defined in the nodes
section, one for each switch. In the connections section, links between switches are
defined and labelled with port numbers. Only switch locations are defined, and two
constant arrays are required to specify the location of each host in terms of the switch
to which it is connected, and the port number of each host.
In the specification in Figure 5, the actual space specification is parametric and
hence solely dependent on the value of k. By contrast, the constant definitions are spe-
cific for k=6. In the full SDN model, all of these are defined parametrically and hence a
fat-tree topology of any size can be specified by changing the value of k.
The definition of the collective in Figure 6 defines the location of each switch and
host component using the @[. . .] notation. Each switch is located at its switch location,
and Host Switch is used to determine the location of each host. In the current model,
hosts are not mobile, and hence their locations are fixed. However, it would be straight-
forward to have mobile hosts whose locations (represented by the switch to which they
are currently attached) change over time. In this case, the array would be used to define
the initial location of each host.
5.2 Space and communication
All communication between switches and hosts use a single unicast action comm (we
discuss communication between switches and controller below). The fact that a single
action is used is exactly what allows for the definition of generic components. If comm
were replaced with actions that describe communication between specific components,
it would be necessary to describe each network element as a separate component. In
many process-algebra-style languages, the use of a single action would mean that all
process with that action would be able to communicate with each other (assuming var-
ious forms of hiding are not used). Because CARMA implements attribute-based com-
munication, predicates can be used to ensure that this free-for-all does not happen. The
predicates used in the SDN model use the space description to determine which net-
work elements are directly connected to each other. These are captured by the functions
appearing in Figure 3, specifically ReceiverIsConn and SenderIsConn. These functions
take two arguments, my.loc and loc, which are the location of the sender and receiver
respectively. In the case of communication between a switch and a host communica-
tion, it is necessary to check that the switch and host have the same location. In the case
of communication between a switch and another switch, it is necessary to check that
the receiver switch is in the post set of the sending switch with respect to the topology
defined by the space description. This is checked with the syntax loc in my.loc.post.
There are additional checks on port numbers which are defined on the connections.
By contrast, ReceiverIsContr and SenderIsContr, and the predicates loc = [i] in the
controller in Figure 4 just check that the identifier is correct rather than for any connec-
tivity. This provides for different levels of abstraction of networking in the model. To
focus on network performance between hosts, we have chosen to model the movement
of packets in the network between hosts at a fine-grained level (but not so fine-grained
that we model varying packet sizes) whereas the communication between switches and
controller is modelled more abstractly without packet-level details. This choice allows
a focus on specific aspects of the model; in our case, the measurement of latency of
actual traffic in the network. For the two scenarios we are considering, the secondary
traffic between switches and controller is only for data collection and plays a negligible
role and hence we can omit its detailed modelling.
5.3 The collective and environment
Figure 6 describes global constants and variables, together with the initial specification
of the collective and the evolution functions of the environment. The number of ports
in a switch is a global constant as are the total number of switches and host. Addi-
tional aspects of the space description are global constants. Globally, two variables are
tracked. The number of packets that have been received, together with total amount of
time taken by these packets in traversing the next allowing the creation of a measure to
describe this with the following syntax.
Global constants: k number of ports in a switch
S total number of switches: S = 5k2/4
H total number of hosts: H = k3/4
FatTree description of network structure
Host Switch array that allocates hosts to switches
Host Port array that allocates hosts to ports
Global store: pkt time sum of time taken by each packet
pkt count total number of packets received
Collective: Timer single Timer component
Switch@[i] for 0≤ i≤ S−1
Controller@[Con] single Controller component
Host@[Host Switchj] for 0≤ j ≤ H−1
Evolution rule functions:
µp(γs,γr,α) = 1
µw(γs,γr,α) = 1
µr(γs,α) =

λc α = comm
λss α = send stats
λru α = rule update
λcc α = contr comm?
. . . α = gen pkt type?i
. . . other traffic pattern actions
fast otherwise
µu(γs,α) =

{pkt count← pkt count+1
pkt time← pkt time+(now− γs(in pkt.time sent)},0
α = log packet?
{},0 otherwise
Fig. 6. Global constants, global store, collective and environment functions
measure average_latency
= global.pkt_time / global.pkt_count
As mentioned previously, the collective defines the individual copies of components
with their locations. The timer component is not located. The evolution rule functions
for probabilities and weights have a default value of 1 as these are not used in the SDN
modelling. Most actions have the rate fast which means that they are essentially im-
mediate. Other actions include communication, sending of statistics, updating of rules
have constant rates, and as discussed previously traffic pattern rates may be based on
information about senders and receivers.
The update function does nothing for all actions except packet log?. In the case of
this action, when a packet is received by any host, the packet count is increased and
the total time taken is increased appropriately, using information about when the packet
was sent which is stored in the packet itself. This abstracts from the details relating to
clock drift that can be involved in measuring packet latency in real networks. None of
the actions introduce new components to the collective. In the SDN model described
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Fig. 7. Packet latency for balanced and unbalanced routing
here, there is a fixed number of network elements which neither increase nor decrease
during the model execution. In a model where hosts may appear and disappear, the
update function would specify the action that would trigger the introduction of new
host which would be instantiated with the relevant attribute values. Host components
can disappear through the use of kill. It is also possible to add behaviour to capture the
temporary impairment of all network elements.
6 Experiments and results
We consider two experiments to illustrate the use of CARMA and MultiVeStA in con-
sidering the scalability of the fat-tree topology in the context of SDN and data centres
[5]. These experiments report of the averages of measures and probabilities over mul-
tiple simulation runs performed by the CARMA software. We also mention the results
of a security-focussed experiment that has been reported elsewhere [10]. These models
assume the use of gigabit per second networks and have the communication and switch
rates calibrated accordingly.
6.1 Scalability of topology
This experiment considers two important aspects of fat-tree topology. In the first place,
it compares the effect of multiple routes and how this allows for higher traffic loads to
be viable. This is achieved by considered a balanced routing over the network and an
unbalanced routing where all routes go through a single core switch of the network. Fur-
thermore, we consider these for different number of ports, to assess whether the scaling
is similar for different size networks. For this scenario, we assume equal traffic between
each pair of hosts, and increase the rate of this traffic to the point that the switches start
to become overloaded, and the packet latency increases so that the switches are un-
able to support the line speed of the network. These results are reported in Figure 7.
Data points are only included for experiments where latency reached steady state. The
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Fig. 8. Heat maps of queue size probabilities
fat-tree topology scales moderately well when routing is balanced. For k of 6 or more,
performance starts to drop off at a rate of 1.00. In the case of k = 8, there are 16256
flows at this rate, and for k = 10, there are 62250 flows at this rate (the table in Fig-
ure 9 shows how the number of flows increase as k increases). In the case when routing
is unbalanced to the extent that all flows go through a single core router, performance
declines at lower rates as k increases. This emphasises the need for an SDN controller
to utilise good load balancing algorithms to ensure good performance.
6.2 MapReduce traffic modelling
MapReduce describes a particular pattern of interaction between computers performing
large computations [2]. A fixed number of hosts, say n, first perform a number of com-
putations that can be done independently (the map phase). Once this phase is over, the
results of the computation must be integrated via some computation and hence must be
transferred to a single host (the reduce phase). This results in periods of limited traffic
and then high traffic for the communication of results.
The SDN CARMA model supports the modelling of this traffic pattern. When this
pattern is activated, then there is an exponentially distributed duration in which there is
limited communication between hosts, followed by a duration (drawn from a different
exponential distribution) during which there are high levels of traffic from n−1 of the
hosts to the remaining host, and this alternating pattern repeats. We will refer to these
as the computation phase and the communication phase, respectively.
In the previous experiment above that considered uniform traffic, it was assumed
that the data centre network was being used by a single client (or alternatively that each
host was shared by every client in the data centre) since there was traffic between all
hosts. In the MapReduce experiment, a more constrained scenario is considered. First,
for reasons of security, we assume that each host is used by a single client; second, we
assume that each client has been allocated 2k2/4 hosts, and these hosts are connected
to two pods. Thus, some of the traffic in the communication phase must traverse core
switches to move between pods. For a fat-tree topology-based on k-port switches, this
means that there are k/2 clients, each with a MapReduce traffic pattern (using the same
exponential rates for periods of computation and communication).
We are interested in understanding the effect on maximum queue size of different
rates for the MapReduce traffic pattern. We use a MultiVeStA query to determine the
probabilities of a particular queue size for variations in the duration of the computation
k 4 6 8 10
1 tu 0.2s 1.3s 5.2s 19.4s
1000 tu 0.1h 0.4h 1.4h 5.4h
Hosts 16 54 128 250
Flows 240 2862 16256 62250
Packets 77.2K 132.5K 126.3K 248.5K
Packet rate 5.0 2.5 1.0 1.0
Components 38 101 210 377
Fig. 9. Packet latency for path hopping mitigation of the Sneak-Peek attack [10] (left). Execution
times for different values of k (right).
phase and variations in rate of traffic during the communication phase. We do not vary
the duration of the communication phase. Figure 8 illustrates the probabilities obtained
when considering a queue size of 2, 4 and 8. As can be seen, the rate of traffic during
the communication phase has a greater impact on the queue size than the average du-
ration of the gap (expresses as milliseconds) for the range of value considered. Since
larger queue sizes (over 2) are associated with increased packet latency, these results
demonstrate that decreased performance is likely to occur with packet rates over 4 for
communication duration of up to 60ms.
6.3 Trade-offs in network security
We have also investigated security-performance trade-offs for the fat-tree topology [10]
when considering mitigations of a covert channel attack call Sneak-Peek [41]. The mit-
igations involves changing route frequently (called path hopping) to disrupt an existing
covert channel. Path hopping requires that new routes are sent to switches which causes
delays in packet processing and increases latency. Realistic data for switch update de-
lays have been used [37]. Experimentation (shown in Figure 9) revealed that very fre-
quent path hopping (every 25ms) results in a 50% increase in latency. However, path
hopping every second did not appear to increase the latency. Since the ability to cre-
ate a covert channel with the Sneak-Peek attack requires shared network infrastructure,
this model has been further investigated with MultiVeStA queries of the form “What
is the probability that there will be a shared network component for a duration of x
milliseconds?” thereby quantifying the risk of an attack [10].
7 Evaluation and conclusion
We now evaluate the use of CARMA and MultiVeStA and consider some metrics of
relevance. We compare various metrics for the uniform traffic experiment described in
Section 6.1 and the figures in right-hand-side of Figure 9 were obtained on a single core
of a 2.66Hz processor with 8GB of memory available. Each time unit (tu) of simulation
represents a millisecond of network time. The packet rate was chosen to be at a level
where the network was fully loaded but not congested. The table includes the number of
flows (between each pair of hosts), the packet rate and the number of packets transmitted
in 1000tu. The last line is the number of components in the CARMA model. The time for
the simulation of almost 20 seconds of network time in the 10-port case is moderately
high; however, many independent simulations can be spread over different cores or
computers, and hence averages over all simulations can be obtained in that time.
In terms of model construction, the fat-tree size can be increased by changing a sin-
gle constant in the model code. Traffic patterns such as the MapReduce pattern can be
specified parametrically as well. Hence it is possible to investigate regular topologies by
only changing the model for the topology and relevant traffic patterns. Irregular network
structures are likely to require more modifications of the mode code. The current model
is around 1200 lines of CaSL code. Of this, about 25% of the code is components, col-
lective, environment and measures; 10% is network and traffic specification; and 10%
is parameters and data structure definition. The remainder are the function definitions
required for the model, including the topology and routing determination, the predicates
for constraining interaction between components, and calculations of network flows.
Further research includes comparison of model-building time and effort needed for
the CARMA approach and the use of mininet, both for the initial model and for model
changes; validation of small-scale CARMA models using mininet emulation, and exper-
imentation with data and configurations from a real datacentre.
This research has demonstrated that CARMA is indeed suitable for modelling net-
work and there is a good match between the discrete space syntax and the requirement
for the description of network topology. Furthermore, this supports generic component
definition, and leads to a model with a few generic components which aids compre-
hension. The richness of CARMA in terms of data structures and support for functions
provides a step beyond what is usually possible in process-algebra-style modelling.
The comparison of the usability of our approach to others is hard to assess, partly
because of different levels of abstraction. Certainly, our approach provides a level of
abstraction that is novel in terms of assessing the performance of SDN networks. Fur-
thermore, if we know that the generic components work correctly, then debugging can
focus on the network specification. Hence, this level of abstraction allows for speed
in developing, debugging and simulating models with a fast turn-around which is not
possible with full-stack emulation or simulation methods, as shown by similar formal
methods research [31]. Furthermore, very few formal methods take a quantitative ap-
proach which is required if performance is to be measured. The hybrid simulation ap-
proach using DEVS and TopoGen [8, 30] is the closest to our research and works with
network specification languages that could be used to obtain the CARMA network de-
scription. We believe that our style of light-weight modelling style has a role to play,
and the next phase of development is to embody our approach in software that conceals
the details of the CARMA from a user without experience of formal methods to provide
a software tool which enables specification of network topologies and traffic patterns in
a simple format with graphical elements where appropriate.
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